SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK COUNTY OF NEW YORK : PART 61

REZWANUL CHOWDHURY, ALBERTO MORENO, ABDIAS PEREZ, YOBANI TARAX, GUILLERMO CHAVEZ, CARLOS LAZARO RAMOS, NELSON CRISANTOS, BARAQUEL CRUZ, ROSALIO RUIZ, JESSE SANCHEZ, IVAN GARCIA, and MARCOS FLORES on behalf of themselves and others similarly situated,

Plaintiffs,

-against-

Index No. 153996-14

GK GRILL LLC d/b/a LE MARAIS RESTAURANT, and JOSE MEIRAIS RESTAURANT, and JOSE MEIRELLES,

Defendants.

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October 29, 2014 80 Centre Street New York, New York

BEFORE: HON. ANIL C. SINGH

Supreme Court Justice

APPEARANCES:

Attorney for Plaintiff
JEFFREY E. GOLDMAN, ESQ.
501 5th Avenue
New York, New York 10017
BY: Jeffrey E. Goldman, Esq.

Attorney For Defendant ELI Z. FREEDBERG, ESQ. 370 Lexington Avenue, Ste 2103 New York, NY 10017 BY: Eli Z. Freedberg, Esq.

JACQUELINE GLASS Senior Court Reporter

1	Proceedings
2	THE COURT: On the record. I have
3	before me a motion by the defendants to dismiss
4	this wage action brought by the plaintiff. The
5	plaintiff opposes the motion and by separate
6	motion moves to maintain this action in the form
7	of a class action. The defendant opposes that
8	motion.
9	So I'll hear first since the motion to
10	dismiss could potentially be dispositive. I'll
11	hear argument first on the motion to dismiss.
12	MR. FREEDBERG: Thank you, your Honor.
13	Eli Freedberg from the law office of Eli Freedberg
14	PC for the defendants. Thank you for hearing us
15	today. Shall I limit this just to the motion to
16	dismiss?
17	THE COURT: Yes.
18	MR. FREEDBERG: Just to the motion to
19	dismiss, plaintiffs have alleged a number of
20	claims against defendants. Defendants operate a
21	kosher steakhouse in the Times Square area of
22	Manhattan. It has been in operation for well over
23	ten years. The genesis of plaintiff's claims in
2 4	this case pretty much all concern the
25	participation of a maitre d.
26	THE COURT: Pooling of tips.

1	Proceedings
2	MR. FREEDBERG: That's correct. So
3	THE COURT: Your argument on a motion to
4	dismiss in part seems to be that the allegations
5	are conclusory as to the function of the maitre d
6	etcetera etcetera and that's the basis to dismiss.
7	Is that appropriate at this juncture as opposed to
8	after discovery and on a motion for summary
9	judgment?
10	MR. FREEDBERG: Partially, your Honor.
11	Plaintiff's complaint is rather vague. They do
12	have more concrete allegations against one of the
13	alleged, against one of the maitre d's Danny Viti.
14	I'd like to put his claims, plaintiff's claim
15	concerning him aside for a moment.
16	THE COURT: The claim is against the
17	restaurant not just the maitre d. The maitre d is
18	the alleged person who is sharing in this, but the
19	claim is against the restaurant. So wouldn't we
20	look at them together?
21	MR. FREEDBERG: Could you rephrase that,
22	your Honor?
23	THE COURT: Wouldn't we look at the
24	claim together? The claim essentially is there
25	has been an unlawful sharing of tips.
26	MR. FREEDBERG: I would argue no, your

Honor. That you would separate the claims because discovery is affected. If the plaintiffs have not stated the claim as to two of the people that they are complaining should not have received tips, then discovery and just the costs associated with discovery would be significant larger. It will be additional depositions, additional perhaps records.

THE COURT: With respect to the two why do you believe that sufficient allegations haven't been stated?

MR. FREEDBERG: There is no concrete allegation that any plaintiff was hired, fired, suspended, disciplined, interviewed, any of the criteria that courts in the state and Federal courts, courts in the circuit apply to determine whether an employee is eligible to participate in a tip pool. So with respect to -- we have requested from this court to please narrow the claims that are discoverable, certainly with respect to the individuals identified as Manning Jordon.

With respect to Mr. Viti, I concede their claims are probably detailed enough to state a claim and those claims to the extent they are

1	Proceedings
2	dismissable that would be more appropriate for a
3	summary judgment.
4	THE COURT: Okay.
5	MR. FREEDBERG: One of the other
6	components to our motion to dismiss are the
7	damages that plaintiffs are alleging. And again 1
8	think this is amenable to a motion to dismiss
9	because the parties are going to engage in
10	settlement discussions during the pendency of
11	discovery.
12	Court's decision, this court's decision on
13	that issue is incredibly germane and frankly it's
14	a strictly legal issue. There is no discovery
15	taken. No damages available for Section 196(d).
16	THE COURT: What do you rely on for your
17	argument that damages aren't recoverable under
18	MR. FREEDBERG: The explicit wording of
19	the statute for one of the the explicit wording
20	of the regulations that have been in effect.
21	THE COURT: What, the ream of Federal
22	court cases cited by the plaintiff? Your response
23	seems to be they are all wrongly decided.
24	MR. FREEDBERG: Not only that. There
25	have been one or two Federal courts that have been
26	wrongly decided. Even the cases cited by

2 plaintiffs don't support the interpretation that a 3 violation of 196(d) yields tip credit damages.

For example, in the Wicaksono case cited by plaintiffs, that's not a tip credit case. And the plaintiffs -- the court did not determine explicitly or implicitly that tip credit damages are available if an ineligible employee participates in the tip pool.

Similarly, in the Chung versus New Silver
Palace case, I would in fact read that case to
support defendant's position that the damages, tip
credit damages are available for a Federal Fair
Labor Standards Act violation which are not
alleged here. And the appropriate remedy for
196(d) violation which plaintiffs do allege here
is disgorgement of the tips received by the
employee who allegedly should not have
participated in the tip pool. The same thing in
the Paguay versus Buona Fortuna case. Again to be
actually supportive of defendants and again that
isn't to say there are one or two cases plaintiffs
have cited. I believe the Federal court was
simply wrong. In support of that --

THE COURT: What about the state cases?

26 MR. FREEDBERG: There are none.

1	Proceedings
2	THE COURT: You refer to as I recall an
3	opinion.
4	MR. FREEDBERG: Yes.
5	THE COURT: Is that opinion binding on
6	me in any way?
7	MR. FREEDBERG: It's at the very least
8	persuasive, your Honor. The Department of Labor
9	as I'm sure you know is the administrative agency
10	charged with enforcing the charged with
11	enforcing.
12	THE COURT: It's a rather old opinion as
13	well.
14	MR. FREEDBERG: It is, your Honor, and
15	it isn't. It's all relative. But I would argue
16	that there is nothing that superseded it. In
17	fact, to the extent that plaintiffs argue that it
18	has been superseded, it would be because there is
19	a new wage order that governs employer,
20	hospitality employers. And even that regulation I
21	propose to the court further supports the
22	defendant's arguments that tip credit damages are
23	unavailable. I do have a regulation here.
24	THE COURT: Go on.
25	MR. FREEDBERG: But that regulation is
26	incredibly specific about what the prerequisites

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are for an employer taking tip credit. And the prerequisites are number one that the employee simply earns enough in tips to take that employee over the minimum wage per hour which plaintiffs do not allege is an issue here. These are very highly tipped employees. Even if plaintiff is right, their hourly compensation is well above the minimum wage. It's not been alleged and it's not an issue here.

The second prerequisite in the new wage order is that the employer provides notice of the intent to apply tip credit. And again that's not a claim that plaintiffs are asserting. And in fact, I could tell and represent to your Honor that defendants do present a rate of pay notice form that goes to every employee. And has been doing that since the inception of the wage order in 2011 and doesn't inform each employee each employee will be applying a tip allowance towards their wages. There is nothing within the plain text of the regulations that say that if an ineligible employee participates in a tip pool, you lost tip credit. And that would frankly be contrary to the plain language of the statute which says that nothing construed, and I'm paraphrasing, nothing

1	Proceedings
2	construed herein shall affect an employer's
3	ability to apply, take an allowance for the
4	employee's tips.
5	THE COURT: Anything else, counsel?
6	MR. FREEDBERG: One other point.
7	Defendants have produced and moved to dismiss for
8	documentary evidence. Defendants have been paying
9	spread of hour compensation which is one of the
10	plaintiff's claims for 2011. We believe the
11	documentary evidence we submitted along with our
12	papers have demonstrated that. And we believe
13	that as a matter of law because plaintiffs'
14	compensation was high in light of the tips that
15	they have been receiving prior to the prior to
16	the wage order changing in 2011 there was no
17	obligation for an employer to actually pay spread
18	of hours before that time. And that's a basis for
19	our motion. Thank you.
20	THE COURT: Thank you. Counsel.
21	MR. GOLDMAN: Thank you. Jeff Goldman
22	from the law office of Jeff Goldman.
23	Your Honor, has obviously read the papers
2 4	very carefully and is very familiar with the law.
25	The real question at this stage is we're at the
26	motion to dismiss stage. The burden is a very

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2 high burden --

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I have to assume that the statements made in the complaint are true, but at least with respect to two of the individual disposition of the defendant that they are not sufficient allegations to suggest that they are in that position where it would be improper for them to share tips. So why don't you respond specifically how your client shows that they have that kind of authority that would not allow them to share tips.

MR. GOLDMAN: Our complaint along with the affidavits that we submitted, twelve affidavits that we submitted is what we're submitting to you. We have outlined in the complaint how maitre d's took this money. not specifically name Danny Viti. I'm sorry. The two that he referenced. We're not required to name them. We named them as a class of people as maitre d's. My intuition tells me they may have fluctuated between captains. Not only did maitre d's participate in a tipout, but captains may have also participated in a tipout. These individuals that he's referring to may have been captains at different time periods. Plaintiffs at this stage,

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at this early stage have alleged clearly that the maitre d's who took anywhere from it looks like it's between 7 and 10 percent of the tipout off the top are not entitled to do that, based on the amount of supervisory responsibility that they And we've alleged facts sufficient to overcome that hurdle at this early juncture. may turn out that the only one that is a legitimate maitre d may be Mr. Viti. But I can't foresee what may or may not be the scenario with regard to these other two gentlemen. because I've met all twelve of the people who have come and complained about this, that Mr. Viti obviously takes is a larger than life person in sort of the restaurant world and that's why all of them have remembered him by name. That does not preclude that -- they've also said clearly that the other maitre d's participated in the tip pool. Some of the maitre d didn't last that long. been doing restaurant cases since 2003 which brings me to my next point. I along with many many other judges yourself included I'm sure, have stared at 196(d) to try to understand and read the terms there. It's only taken the Court of Appeals multiple times and many judges along the way of

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trying to interpret what 196(d) means. I don't see that there is any clear meaning there that the defendants, that the plaintiff's may not recover the difference between their tips, between their tip credit and the minimum wage. The law is such in the State of New York and in the City of New York that favors the employee and to give the employee the benefit of every possible, of every possible law so I can't see how the court would preclude. I can't see how the legislature would have precluded plaintiffs from being able to recover the difference between the tip credit and what the minimum wage was. We, I should note in our complaint, we sued under Section 650 which is the minimum wage law. Likewise under the overtime law we sued under 650. The spread of hours claim, so under the spread of hours claim we've given you case law. We've been pursuing spread of hours claim for many years prior to 2011. And there is case law that supports the spread of hours. think it was more clearly clarified in 2011, but you could look at the case law that we've provided. I'm sure you already have and you could see that the courts have awarded spread of hours damages. I remember in earlier cases that I

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handled we didn't pursue it because it was so unclear to us at that point, but other judges and opinions that we attached to our brief have awarded spread of hours.

THE COURT: Okay counsel. Just very briefly respond to that and then we'll go onto the class motion.

MR. FREEDBERG: I want to be very clear that defendant's position is, not to say that if plaintiffs were to somehow establish a violation of the law they would be out of luck and without damages. Plaintiffs are seeking -- plaintiffs are seeking two measures of the damages for the same statutory violation. They are seeking first disgorgement of the tips that the alleged maitre d's who are allegedly not allowed to participate in the tip tool received. And in addition to that a separate substantive measure of damages being the tip credit. To me that's manifested in two separate substantive violations for the same act. And I'm sure plaintiffs would be seeking the statutory liquidated damages and penalties and interests on top of both of those violations. it's not, and I want to be crystal clear, it's not defendant's position that plaintiffs would not be

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entitled to any damages if they are able to establish any violation. There is a measure of damages. The proper measure of damages is the tip misappropriation that the maitre d allegedly received.

And finally, your Honor, 190.60 is not that. It's not at all ambiguous I would posit. first sentence reads, "no employer or its agent or officer other agent of any corporation or any other person shall demand, accept, directly or indirectly any part of the gratuities received by an employee or retain any part of a gratuity or any charge purported to be a gratuity by an employee." To me that's simple. An employer can't take an employee's gratuity. Who the employer is, that's a legal question the courts have been wrestling with and that's what we're fighting over here, whether the maitre d constitute an employer. Then there is another sentence not relevant here so I'll skip that. then nothing in this subdivision shall be construed as affecting the allowances from the minimum wage for gratuities in accordance with the provisions of Article 19 of this chapter. Nothina ambiguous about that counsel. That says in plain

1	Proceedings
2	English to me that nothing in the statute shall
3	prevent an employer from taking the tip credit
4	allowance. Thank you.
5	THE COURT: Okay. The class action.
6	MR. GOLDMAN: So we are seeking to
7	certify this as a class action. In certain sense
8	job has been made easier. Defendants have pointed
9	out to you this case has been certified as a
10	collective action. For reasons unknown to me they
11	decided not to settle the class action and only to
12	settle a little small portion of the case which
13	left a whole lot of people left out there hanging.
14	So numerosity we alleged and we provide you with
15	affidavits to that, certified over a hundred
16	people would be members of this class. The
17	turnover, we've explained the turnover in
18	restaurant as we all know is very high. There is
19	some argument about there is only 62 possible
20	people, but in fact the number we compared tipout
21	sheets from earlier periods to current periods and
22	almost none of the names were the same or many of
23	the names were not the same. So we feel that that
24	is, you know, that we have meet the numerosity
25	requirement.
26	Counsel brings forward a very novel argument

2 saying well because the busboys get paid off the 3 top that somehow that that doesn't -- that they don't meet the numerosity requirement. Again there is no case law that supports that argument. 5 6 No case notation in his brief to that affect and having done these cases for twelve years the 8 maitre d gets paid off the top. The manager gets 9 paid off the top. And the busboy as in this case 10 who often doesn't speak the language, gets paid 11 off the bottom. And we've also shown you in our 12 documentation that it's not 20 percent, but that 13 it's 20.1 percent or 16.9 percent and it's all 14 laid out in our document which you've seen. 15 Commonality. The questions in this case are all 16 common. Whether they were paid -- everybody was 17 paid \$5 an hour or 4.65 an hour depending on the 18 time period. Is that wrong or is that right? 19 Cross the board with the question. The other 20 question they were all time shaped. It's occurred 21 to me finally after all these years and by sitting 22 down one day and reading the manual and this is a 23 particular manual related to the point of sale POS 24 system, the manual states in no less than five 25 different spots you must clock everyone out before 26 you start doing the nightly calculation. And this

2 has resulted in all of our busboys across all of 3 our cases saying that when I went to go punch myself and punch my number, I was already punched Who punched you out? It was because of the 5 out. 6 maitre d on duty or manager on duty. It's because of the system when we get further along with this 8 case we'll discover whatever system they used. 9 have a feeling it will be similar to the point of 10 sale system which requires everyone be checked 11 Maitre d's doesn't want to stay there until out. 2 in the morning so he starts his paperwork at 12 13 some hour 11 or 12 o'clock at night. Commonality. 14 We talked about the overtime, very common. them was a POS policy or under information policy 15 16 or practice the maitre d would check these people Prior I think before the first lawsuit all 17 011t. 18 of the servers worked anywhere from fifty to sixty 19 hours a week. None of them were paid over time. 20 They were forced to work fifty to sixty hours a 21 week not paid overtime. Provided you with 22 affidavits as to the service those working during 23 that period of time and the ones required to work 24 overtime. Typically, that the claims of the class 25 representatives are typical of the rest of the 26 claims, and I think you could see that from the

1	Proceedings
2	affidavits. These are all busboys and people who
3	were paid tip credit wage. These are all people
4	who were forced to participate in the mandatory
5	tip pool. And these people's wages we feel they
6	were taken unfairly. The third to forth criteria
7	is that the class representatives were fairly and
8	accurately represent the class. We've picked two
9	class representatives out of the twelve.
10	Obviously it's happened in cases where other
11	people have come forward in class representatives
12	as well. I myself, am I an adequate
13	representative for the class? I've been handling
14	wage cases since 2002, received many successful
15	settlements on behalf of my clients. And the
16	class action is a fair and efficient way to
17	adjudicate this matter. People who are making
18	less than minimum wage can hardly afford a lawyer
19	and if you decertify the class, or didn't allow
20	the class to go forward, as a lawyer many people
21	wouldn't be able to get legal representation and
22	the ability to collect fees and to handle this as
23	a class is what ultimately benefits the client.
2 4	THE COURT: Counsel. Very briefly.
25	MR. FREEDBERG: Thank you, your Honor.
2 6	THE COURT: Why shouldn't I certify a

1	Proceedings
2	class action?
3	MR. FREEDBERG: Because plaintiffs have
4	not satisfied the elements of commonality.
5	THE COURT: Why not? Aren't the claims
6	essentially the same?
7	MR. FREEDBERG: They are not, your
8	Honor. There is a wide gap between the potential
9	claims of the bartender busboys. The bartenders
10	and busboys on one hand and the runners and
11	waiting on the other hand.
12	THE COURT: Clearly the job duty are
13	different, but isn't the claim the same? It all
14	arises out of how tips are allocated.
15	MR. FREEDBERG: The claims arise how
16	tips are allocated, but plaintiffs misstate the
17	way the tip pool is structured. The way the tip
18	pool is structured there is no possibility that
19	bartenders and busers were harmed.
20	THE COURT: And that goes to.
21	MR. FREEDBERG: Commonality. It
22	absolutely does. Even if plaintiffs are able to
23	establish their violation, they cannot establish
24	that there was any harm onto the busboys and
25	bartenders because they are getting tips, to use
26	plaintiff's term off the top.

1	Proceedings
2	THE COURT: I think plaintiff's term is
3	off the bottom.
4	MR. FREEDBERG: They are incorrect.
5	THE COURT: So in other words, I have to
6	make that finding now as to whether tips are from
7	the top or from the bottom?
8	MR. FREEDBERG: Correct, your Honor.
9	THE COURT: You don't think that's more
10	appropriate for summary judgment.
11	MR. FREEDBERG: Absolutely not. This is
12	a procedural issue to determine whether the claims
13	of the individual class members are cohesive and
14	unified and they are not here. Those require a
15	substantive finding here. This is not a motion to
16	dismiss standard. There is an evidentiary
17	standard plaintiffs have to meet and which I
18	submit they fail to meet. The structure of the
19	tip pool is such that each bartender that is on a
20	particular tip give 5 percent of the tips off the
21	top regardless of the maitre d's participation if
22	there is a thousand dollars in tips.
23	THE COURT: You are saying they are off
24	the top.
25	MR. FREEDBERG: So there is no harm. If
26	part of the class is not harmed and part of the

1	Proceedings
2	class is harmed, class certification must be
3	denied at least with respect to the people that
4	weren't harmed.
5	THE COURT: Commonality is where you put
6	most of your eggs.
7	MR. FREEDBERG: Commonality and
8	typically because definitions of those
9	THE COURT: Respond very briefly to just
10	to the commonality typically.
11	MR. GOLDMAN: Sure. If the maitre d
12	didn't participate in the tip out
13	THE COURT: His position the bartenders
14	get off the top and if they get off the top how is
15	there how are they harmed, the bartenders.
16	MR. GOLDMAN: If there is ten percent
17	more to give to the bartenders and the busboys
18	then you don't know how. He's asking you to
19	speculate how the tip out would be divided. He's
20	bringing up a novel theory that's never been tried
21	before and he's asking you on a motion to dismiss
22	without
23	THE COURT: It's not a motion to
2 4	dismiss.
25	MR. GOLDMAN: Preliminary stage to rule
26	on this issue. There is no way to know how the

1	Proceedings
2	tips would be divided if the maitre d wasn't part
3	of that tip pool. The busboys they get 22 percent
4	and again we talked in our brief and I said
5	earlier that it's not a uniform policy. We
6	attached some of the tipout sheets that showed one
7	night the busboys got 16.9 percent. Another night
8	they got 21 percent or 20.1 percent or some other
9	percentage. So it's not off the top. The policy
10	is erratic. Restaurant in general by their very
11	nature are erratic and at this early juncture,
12	this is an argument for summary judgment in six
13	months from now. This is not an argument, a novel
14	argument like this to be made at this stage of the
15	litigation.
16	THE COURT: Okay. Thank you folks.
17	MR. FREEDBERG: Can I add one more
18	point?
19	THE COURT: But your adversary on this
20	motion gets the last word. One point.
21	MR. FREEDBERG: I want to address the
22	off the clock claims.
23	THE COURT: Sure.
24	MR. FREEDBERG: We have cited today a
25	number of decisions within courts of this state so
26	off the clock claims paid overtime claims are not

1	Proceedings
2	amenable to class action certification. Because
3	really by their very nature they require
4	individual mini trials. We would still be
5	required, I believe, we would have the right to
6	depose every single member of the class to go
7	through every single time entry.
8	THE COURT: Counsel, you want to address
9	that.
10	MR. GOLDMAN: Very briefly. He's
11	talking about the Walmart case, two hundred
12	thousand people. Your Honor addressed it in the
13	Weinstein decision. Do I need to say anymore than
14	that? There are 60 to 100 people in this class.
15	THE COURT: Thank you.
16	MR. GOLDMAN: Thank you, your Honor.
17	THE COURT: Have a good day folks.
18	Certified to be a true and accurate transcript of the original stenographic
19	notes.
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21	JACQUELINE GLASS
22	SENIOR COURT REPORTER
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